
Hella Yes.
Now if only I can get my scabbing car's leaky radiator hose fixed on time for the event at UT.
Solidarity to all of those who go out today to march against the real luddites.
Marauding through Culture, Philosophy and Politics.
(1)-“THE theory of historical materialism has brought to light some most important truths. Humanity is not an animal species, it is a historical reality. Human society is an antiphysis – in a sense it is against nature; it does not passively submit to the presence of nature but rather takes over the control of nature on its own behalf. This arrogation is not an inward, subjective operation; it is accomplished objectively in practical action.” – Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex
(2)-“About 1848 the combined actions of the Saint-Simonians, the Positivists and Marx gave birth to the dream of an ‘anti-nature’. The expression ‘anti-nature’ was actually invented by Comte; and in the Marx-Engels correspondence we find the term antiphysis. The doctrines may be different but the ideal was the same: it was to inaugurate a human order which would be directly opposed to the errors, injustices, and blind mechanical forces of the natural World. The new factor which distinguished this order from the ‘City of ends’ which Kant put forward at the close of the eighteenth century and which he, too opposed to strict determinism. The new factor was work [labor]”- Jean Paul Sartre, Baudelaire (addition in parentheses mine)
The history Sartre gives here for the term 'antiphysis' is probably dubious though the shared conception may be right. if anyone can find where Marx or Engels use it (if they really did) let me know. But finally, later Sartre...
(3)-“nature is universality, which means that, at first sight the worker is just like the bourgeois. Respectability is anti-nature. The bourgeois becomes respectable (distingue) by suppressing his needs.”- Jean Paul Sartre, The Family Idiot
We have here antiphysis/antinature used not just in three contexts but in three very distinct senses. In (1) anti-nature simply is the human reality or at least an aspect of it. By virtue of being conscious subjects, able to perform not just actions but praxis, humanity is then, by definition a sort of animal-that-is-not-an-animal. Not just a little different (smarter, able to do more) but of a whole other qualitative order. Readers of Shulamith Firestone know this is used to great effect in her work.
In (2), anti-nature is not the human reality, but a human project, something to be realized with the proper social, political, and technological machinery. Yet it does share a commonality with (1) in that the intention is precisely to create a human totality (one that reflects the intent of serving human needs), in the same sense that ‘nature’ is supposed to be the given totality.
(3), however, is the most difficult to relate of the bunch, because it refers to a kind of subject-position. A person is anti-nature in the sense that they could also be anti-waste (thrifty) or pro-family (patriarchal). The practice of suppressing the public appearance of one’s biological body and the creation of distinction is here an open display of one’s anti-natural attitude. We’re not like those “salt of the earth” people, the distinguished person says, they’re more akin to animals than ourselves.
Of the quotes, this usage I find the least interesting, partly because it only actually refers to one particular kind of subject position among the well-to-do in response to workers’ collective demands. Social Darwinism and the fad for phrenology could hardly be taken as attempts to cover up the biological, just the opposite. Sartre’s disciplined bourgeois of The Family Idiot aren’t a universal type, even in their own era.
The other aspect of this conception of antinature as a subject position that is deeply unsatisfying is how it drains the radically utopian content out of antiphysis and leaves us with a practically zero-sum choice. One is either distinguished or vulgar, that is, one either accepts nature or represses it in one’s own self. The fantastic possibility of emancipation from nature, and of natural constraints; of free subjects able to stand apart from nature by virtue of ‘satisfying animal needs’ or post-human transcendence of those needs (or both) is rendered absent.
For that reason I think I’ll focus on the two others in future writing.
I haven’t posted much of anything lately. I’ve taken a new job and there have been quite a lot of changes. Nevertheless, there will be more to come soon.
Background for a future post perhaps:
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpagamben2.htm
A London review of books article by Malcolm Bull. Many on the left have adopted an Arendtian or Foucaultian line on biopolitics, namely that by making the body an object of politics, some sphere of freedom, or subjectivity, or something, has been lost. Maybe so. Biopolitics is further conceived as being inextricably linked to racial science and the inhumanity of modern projects. On this count, at least one line from Bull has a strange insight:
"It might be possible to interpret this development [the emergence of the biopolitical] in terms of the reduced importance of fixed social roles within the public sphere and the egalitarian reduction of politics to the life shared by all, irrespective of status, gender, or even species."
That is to say, biopolitics might be inextricably linked to egalitarianism, or at least a kind of egalitarianism. The demands for universal rights to healthcare, nourishment and shelter, are often overtly biopolitical. But how do we avoid the absurd merger of a biopolitics which reduces some to the musselman, and another which in taking bare life as its object, liberates subjects from bare life? How does one combat the grotesque blurring of distinction between an NHS Hospital and a Nazi Death Camp from a perspective that sees biopolitics condemned from the start? It is doubtful that Agamben would allow for this equivalency, but neither does he or others provide sufficient means for rejecting it.
On another note, Bull's statement does bring to mind that eccentric friend of animal(ized?) life, Jeremy Bentham. The same Bentham presented by Foucault as the exemplar of what we may call bourgeois biopolitics. The relationship highlighted by Bull is especially clear in Bentham quotes like these, concerning the plausibility of animal rights:
"It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?...Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?"
But what relationship could this have to an emancipatory biopolitics, I don't know. The answers seem to appear more in shadows, that is, in a negative form. An example of this would be John Maynard Keynes. In Keynes’ mind, whatever the historical Bentham believed in (Bentham was pro-business, writing a defense of usury) Benthamism was not the epitome of bourgeois humanism, but a kind of “worm” gnawing at its civilization through it elevation of “economic criterion” and threatening to reduce it to the level of the philistine economic calculation, Marxism was for Keynes “the final reductio ad absurdum of Benthamism” a symbol of his civilization’s self-destruction.
Yet Bentham’s self-chosen but fate as a stuffed-straw “auto-icon”, a most useful way of death, could point us in a promising direction to answer the dilemma raised earlier. Perhaps the problem with Agamben and the possibility of a totally absurd conflation between the biopolitics of human services and that of Nazism may lie in the fact that while we have a full terminology for a ZoĆ« and Bios, for gradations of life, we entirely lack one for dealing with gradations of death. If indeed, there are any.
This, I admit, is a stab in the dark, but perhaps there are some conceptions of this in existence already. In some of Neve Gordon’s Foucault-inspired analyses, for example, the term “politics of death” (or ‘necropolitics’, we could say)is used and differentiated from a colonial “politics of life” by virtue of the fact that it seeks to reduce or deliberately destroy, rather than employ strategically, the means of life (infrastructure, crops, water resources). The aim is not to produce living ‘pliant bodies’ but externalized corpses.
In this respect the auto-icon, other than its possibly ironic intent of spoofing religious imagery by a militant atheist (there’s a “sacred man”, for you), is also an attempt to continue participation (actively, through a written will) in living society even after the process of decay has taken the body far beyond ‘bare life’.